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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as 
realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the 
coalition and join the new one; in this research we made it possible to leave a coalition but put some 
restrictions to control the behavior of agents. Leaving or staying of an agent in a coalition will affect on the 
trust of the other agents included in this coalition. Agents will use the trust values in computing the 
expected utility of coalitions. Three different risk behaviors are introduced for agents that want to initiate a 
coalition. Using these risk behaviors, some simulations are made and results are analyzed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A multiagent system (MAS) is a system composed of various interacting agents. Based on the 
type of agents, system can be a simple group or a complicated system doing sophisticated 
operations. Agents in a MAS can have different types of objectives they are trying to reach. There 
is not any external decision-maker or centralized processing unit in a MAS; agents work 
autonomously and communicate with each other to do their tasks [1]. Due to lack of resources or 
expertise, agents may not be able to reach their goals by themselves, so they are willing to form 
coalition in order to reach their goals jointly. In most applications of multiagents, agents are 
considered as cooperative, this means that they form coalition to reach common goals. This 
research explores the context of hedonic games; in this context agents are self-interested and their 
coalition satisfaction depends on the composition of the coalition they join. Agents only care 
about their own profit and try to maximize it; so it is not reasonable for these agents to follow 
actions which maximize the global profit not their own profit. Therefore agents in hedonic games 
define a preference order over the set of all coalitions they can join and use this preference order 
to form a satisfactory coalition. Many important problems in multi-agent systems including 
marriage problem, roommate selection, admission proposals in universities, etc. can be 
categorized in the context of hedonic games.  
 
The main usage of hedonic games is in the game theory models in Economics; different models 
have been studied in this domain and some research has been conducted to employ the hedonic 
games concept in Economics models [2,3,4]. These models concentrate on the analysis of agents’ 
behavior; these research studies do not consider a multiagent framework and usually analyze self-
interested agents theoretically. Hedonic games are also frequently studied in the context of 
Artificial Intelligence; these researches basically deals with finding the core solution in Hedonic 
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games, analyzing stability of core and examining its optimality [5,6,7,8]. Some works have been 
published about coalition formation under uncertainty [7,9,10,11], however these works are not in 
the context of Hedonic games and can’t be adopted. 
 
An interesting research study has been published by Genin and Aknine [12]; this research mainly 
deals with autonomous agents that are self-interested, a protocol is defined for coalition formation 
process and some strategies are suggested for proposal acceptance and proposal selection 
mechanisms.  The current research is an extension of this study and tries to consider more 
realistic cases by introducing new behaviors, parameters and mechanisms. 
 
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
 
2.1. Preliminaries  
 
Definition 1: Agent a is an autonomous entity who can sense the environment and make a 
sequence of actions upon to these sensations in order to reach a predefined objective.  
Definition 2: A multiagent system M is a group of n agents M={a1, a2, …, an}that are joined to do 
a/some task(s). These agents may or may not share common resources. 
Definition 3: Coalition c is a nonempty subset of M. Let C denotes the set of all coalitions, then Ci 
denotes all coalitions which agent i belongs to; { }i iC c M a c= ⊂ ∈ . 
Definition 4: A Hedonic game G is a preference order if  defined over sets of agents; ( ), iM f ; 
this preference order is transitive and asymmetric.  
Definition 5: A solution for a Hedonic game is a partition from set of all agents M, {c1, c2,…, ck} 
where 
1
k
jj c M= =∑ and ,  i ji j c c∀ ≠ ∩ = ∅ . 
2.2. Protocol 
 
We do not have any central decision maker and agents in this research decide for themselves via 
negotiation with other agents. During time each agent may receive many proposals for forming 
coalition; it also sends some proposals to other agents asking about their willingness to form 
coalition. We use a simple two-phase protocol: an agreement phase and commitment phase. The 
protocol works as follow:  
 
1- An initiator selects one of its possible coalitions according to its preference operator (it 
will be discussed in later sections); suppose that this coalition includes k agents (1 
initiator and k-1other agents). 
2- Initiator sends the proposal of the selected coalition to all k-1 agents. 
3- Agents respond to initiator with yes or no about their interest in joining this coalition.  
4- If all agents agreed with the proposed coalition, initiator sends a confirmation request to 
all agents and wants them to commit to the coalition, otherwise it sends a cancellation 
message.  
 
If all agents commit to the coalition, initiator informs all members that coalition is formed 
otherwise it sends a cancellation message. 
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3. PROPOSAL ACCEPTANCE STRATEGY 
 
3.1. Proposal Acceptance  
 
Agents in this research are rational; since proposal acceptance does not have any cost, and there is 
always a probability that the current coalitions get broken; agents accept all proposals they 
receive except for the proposals in which they have a utility less than when they are alone. Each 
proposal has a limited waiting time, i.e. agents should respond by that time; otherwise the 
response will be considered as rejection. Three types of agents are considered in this research: 
  
1- Early responders who responds as soon as possible.  
2- Lazy responders who waits to the end of deadline.  
3- Random responders who have a random behavior in responding to the proposals. 
 
3.2. Proposal Confirmation 
 
On confirming proposals, whenever an agent feels that a proposal for a coalition is better than 
current coalition, it can leave current one and join the proposed coalition. Following are some 
considerations in confirming proposals: 
 
1- Each coalition has an obligatory staying time Tc, it means that if an agent enrolled in a 
coalition, it needs to be in the coalition for at least Tc unit of time. If it wants to leave 
coalition sooner, it should pay the penalty Pc. Earned money from penalty will be shared 
between all agents of the coalition equally.  
2- Each agent has a level of honesty Hi; since leaving a coalition is unpleasant from 
viewpoint of other members, the expected utility of leaving current coalition and joining 
the other one should be great enough to tempt agent i to join a new coalition; as an 
example if utility of current coalition is 1000; an agent with honesty level of 0.1 will be 
tempted by a coalition with utility more than 1100 and an agent with level of 0.4 will be 
tempted by a coalition with utility more than 1400. There is another factor that 
discourages agents to leave one coalition: Bad Reputation Coefficient (BRC). To decide 
on leaving current coalition and joining other coalition, agents act in a greedy way: they 
only consider the next timestep. Totally, each agent evaluates the following criterion for 
the next step and if it holds, then it leaves the current coalition and joins the new one.  
Expected utility of current coalition*(1+Hi) < Expected utility of proposed coalition*(1- BRC) 
3- There would be an enrollment fee for each solicited agent, CostEnroll ; the initiator will 
receive a part of this fee as a reward for forming the coalition which benefits all.  
Since confirmation doesn’t mean that the confirmed proposal by this agent will certainly form a 
coalition, the agent may need to confirm some proposals before joining one of them; but there is a 
restriction that an agent at each time step can only confirm a limited number of proposals. 
 
3.3. Trust between Agents 
 
Each agent ai has a record for all other agents that shows its trust in them to not leave the 
coalition. As an example, trij shows the trust ai has in the agent aj to stay in the next step in the 
current coalition; from mathematical point of view, trij is the probability that aj won’t leave the 
group in the next time step. All trust values are initialized by 0.5. In each time step all agents 
update their trust values for other included agents in the coalition; suppose that agent ai in time 
step t wants to update its trust records for agent aj that is in the same coalition as ai is; two cases 
may happen: 
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1- If aj stayed in the current coalition in step t-1, then ai increases the value trij by the special 
trust reward r. 
2- If aj has left the current coalition in step t-1, then ai decreases the value trij by the special 
betray punishment pu. 
The value for pu should be bigger than r to reflect that other agents hate the betrayer agent that 
breaks the coalition. In this research r is 0.01 and pu is considered as 0.05. 
 
3.4. Expected Utility Evaluation  
 
Agent i uses the following formula to calculate the expected utility of current coalition Ccur for the 
next step as: 
( ) ( )
j cur
i cur i cur ij
a C
ExpectedUtility C Utility C tr
∈
= × ∏  
To compute the expected value of a proposed coalition C, agent i uses the following formula: 
( )( ) ( )i leaving enrollExpectedUtility C Utility C Penalty Cost stepCoeff= − + ×  
stepCoeff is a coefficient that lets the agent to consider the likelihood of being more than one time 
step in the proposed coalition; so the stepCoeff is less than one. 
 
4. PROPOSAL SELECTION STRATEGY 
 
We consider a cost CostCom for each proposal the initiator sends. The initiator should consider this 
cost to avoid sending bad proposals, i.e. the proposals that has a little chance of acceptance by all 
agents. Initiator needs a measure to calculate the likelihood of formation of a candidate coalition; 
so it calculates degree of interest of solicited agents based on the similarity with previous 
proposals. 
 
Similar to work done by Genin and Aknine[12] and based on the Bayesian reinforcement learning 
model proposed by Chalkiadakis and Boutiller[11], the normalized distance between two 
coalitions is used in this research to estimate their similarity. Suppose that all agents store all sent 
and received proposals. Therefore if agent i finds a coalition that is similar to previously formed 
coalition, it can hope that this candidate coalition will be formed too. The normalized distance 
between two coalitions c1 and c2 is defined as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 21, \d c c c c c c
n
= ∪ ∩
 
 
For each agent aj in candidate coalition c, initiator calculates ( )rcvjd c , ( )accjd c and ( )refjd c as the 
distance between c and all the proposals received from aj, all the accepted proposals sent to aj and 
all the refused proposals sent to aj accordingly. Using these three values, initiator computes the 
following degree of interest for aj: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min ,rcv acc refj j j jc d c d c d cδ = −
 
( )j cδ  less than zero shows that aj may be interested in c and when ( )j cδ  is greater than zero it 
shows that aj is not. Since a coalition will be formed if and only if all agents are interested, so for 
analyzing the likelihood of formation of a coalition, the degree of most unwilling agent should be 
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considered. If we map the willingness value to the range [0, 1], we can use this value as the 
probability of formation of a coalition (Pformation). 
 
At each step, agents can send a limited number of proposals. If agents were banned to leave a 
formed coalition, initiator could decide on its preference order and evaluate proposals one by one; 
but in this research, agents can leave coalitions. So it is possible that an agent, who is not 
interested in a proposal in time step t, accepts it at time step t+k. Also when the number of agents 
is too large, it is not possible to have a preference order due to cost of memory and computation. 
Based on these facts, agents in this project do not have a preference order; instead they have a 
preference operator based on their risk attitude: 
 
1- Risk seeking: agents in this category weigh the utility of coalition more than the 
possibility of formation.  They risk proposing the coalitions with high utility that may 
have low possibility of formation. They use following measure to choose between the 
proposal they can send: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )  1formationPreference C Utility C P Cα α= × >  
2- Risk-averse: these agents prefer to choose the proposal that has the higher chance to be 
accepted. Following equation is the measure which agents in this category use to 
discriminate different proposals: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )    1formationPreference C Utility C P C β β= × <  
3- Risk-neutral: these agents consider expected value and chance of acceptance in the same 
weight; using this measure they decide which proposal to send: 
( ) ( ) ( )formationPreference C Utility C P C= ×  
At each time step, an initiator creates a set that contains a) a fixed number of random coalitions b) 
some randomly selected proposals from the previously sent proposals and c) some randomly 
selected proposals from previously received proposals. Using this set, initiator selects the best 
proposals it can send using its preference operator. Agents do not send the selected proposal if its 
expected utility is less than a threshold; this threshold is set to 2*CostCom in our work. 
 
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
We conducted 4 different simulations and repeated each simulation 20 times. There are 20 agents 
in each simulation running for 100 time steps. Bad Reputation Coefficient is set to 0.15 and 
Honesty level for each agent is taken from the range [0, 0.35]. Expiration time for accepting and 
confirmation is set to 3 steps. To calculate the utility of coalitions, each agent considers the direct 
interaction with other agents and pairwise interaction of each two other agents in the coalition; 
each agent has a table of estimation of interaction for each two agents (including itself). It finds 
all permutation of size 2 of agents and look up for the value in the estimation table, then sums all 
these value to compute the utility of a given coalition. Each entry in the table is randomly chosen 
from the range [-100, 100].  
 
For the first simulation, all agents are risk seeking; for the second simulation agents are risk 
averse and in the third simulation all the agents are risk neutral. We have considered the equal 
number of each type of agents in the fourth simulation. Gained utility for agents with similar 
honesty levels are averaged for simulations and are depicted in Figure 1. Note that honesty levels 
are divided to 0.05 ranges and each agent is mapped to the closest level in averaging. Results 
show that risk-seeking and risk-neutral agents have similar utility behavior over the changes in 
honesty factor and have the highest utility with the honesty factor [0.15, 0.20]. 
 
Second set of results show the average distribution of initiator, solicited and alone agents per step 
in each simulation. Note that axes are scaled to show the distribution clearly. Figure 2 shows the 
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distribution of alone agents, it can be seen that in the simulation with risk-seeking agents the 
number of alone agents are less than two other simulations. Figure 3 depicts distribution of 
solicited agents that have similar distributions in all three simulations. Distribution of initiator 
agents are depicted in Figure 4; since each coalition has only one initiator, Figure 4 shows the 
number of formed coalitions as well. As results show, number of formed coalitions in simulation 
with risk-neutral agents is less than two other simulations. The average duration of coalitions for 
risk-seeking agents is 8 steps, for risk-averse agents is 12 and for risk neutral agents is 17 steps. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Humans are self-interested and always (with some exceptions and restrictions) follow their 
preferences in their interaction with others. That is why context of “hedonic games,” that includes 
self-interested agents, has been received a significant attention. In this paper we addressed the 
problem of coalition formation in the context of hedonic games. We modelled a realistic case 
where agents at each time step can decide to stay in a coalition or leave. As in reality, when an 
agent leaves a group, other agents lose their trust in the left agent. Agents have an honesty factor; 
the more this honesty factor, the more reliable our agents are. Agents use trust values to estimate 
the possibility of continuing with the coalition they currently are in. We analyzed the gained 
utility of agents regards to their risk behavior in proposing coalitions to 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Utility versus Honesty factor regards to agent types in 4 different simulations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of alone agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of solicited agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of initiator agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes. 
 
 other agents. Results show that different levels of honesty can lead to different utility values for 
distinct risk attitudes. 
 
7. FUTURE WORK 
 
Some ideas for future work are as follows: one may think about considering the level of 
friendship between agents; an agent may accept a proposal from a friend while it doesn’t accept a 
similar proposal with a higher utility from a stranger. As in real world, some people like to be 
manager, some agents may enjoy of being initiator; it would be interesting to consider a factor to 
show the willingness of agents about being an initiator or being solicited. Implementing this 
behavior can be done by introducing a value α in the range [ ]0,1  showing the willingness of each 
agent to be an initiator. An agent with α=0 never propose coalitions to others and an agent with 
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initiator or not. As another future work, one may employ history to estimate duration of candidate 
coalitions to use in the coalition utility evaluation. 
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